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Abstract
Individuals frequently transfer commodities without an explicit contract
or an implicit enforcement mechanism  We design an experiment to study
whether such commodity transfers can be viewed as investments based on
trust and reciprocity or whether they rather resemble presents with dis
tributional intentions  Our experiment essentially modies Berg et al s
investment game by introducing an upper bound to what a contributor
can be repaid afterwards  By varying this upper bound extreme situa
tions such as unrestricted repayment and no repayment dictator giving
can be approximated without altering the verbal instructions otherwise 
Our results show that individuals contribute more when large repayments
are feasible  This is consistent with the trust and reciprocity hypothe
sis  Although distributional concerns in some contributions can be traced
they are not nearly close to a preference for equal payos 
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  Introduction
Due to transaction costs individuals are usually not able to specify all the
details of an agreement in a legally binding contract At best the contract
is incomplete and often transactions are not governed by any contract at all
This observation raises important issues about individual behavior Do people
use implicit enforcement mechanisms in their long term relationships Or are
people motivated by other goals than pure material selfinterest People may
not only care about their own material payos but also about the distribution of
the payos between each other In addition people may take decisions based on
trust and reciprocity This means that they care about each others intentions
that give rise to their payos and distribution 
In an inuential recent experiment Berg Dickhaut and McCabe  		

study an investment game In this game a contributor C owns an amount
of money and can choose to contribute a certain amount c to a reciprocator
R This contribution is then tripled and R can choose to repay any amount
r with    r   c to C The subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is
obvious R will not send any money to C in the second stage Realizing that
C will not give money to R in the rst stage Berg et al focus on the role
of trust and reciprocity in this investment setting The game is well suited
for this purpose there are large potential gains from trade yet contractual
precommitment is not possible and implicit enforcement mechanisms that might
arise from repeated game reputation eects or punishment threats are ruled
out Berg et als experimental data conrm a list of predictions implied by the
trust and reciprocity model For example contributors generally send positive
amounts of money and reciprocators are often found to send back more than
they received
 Recent examples of models in which distributional concerns are important are Fehr and
Kirchsteiger 
 and Fehr and Schmidt 
	 For models of reciprocity see for example
Bolton and Ockenfels 
 or Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
	 
Reputation eects are ruled out because individuals can play the game only once  Pun
ishment threats are avoided by guaranteeing full anonimity 
Several other authors have conducted experimental studies in which aspects of trust
reciprocity and eciency are key features  See for example Fehr Kirchsteiger and Riedl

 Fehr Gachter and Kirchsteiger 
 Guth Ockenfels and Wendel 
 McKelvey
and Palfrey 
  The explicit focus in our paper is on the role of trust and reciprocity versus

However Berg et als analysis does not necessarily rule out the possibility of
pure distributional concerns fairness as an alternative explanation for observed
behavior in the investment game While their data conrm several predictions
of the trust and reciprocity model they are generally also not inconsistent with
a model in which individuals simply care about distributional aspects of realized
gains In this paper we modify the investment game in such a way that we
can study whether individuals really invest based on trust and reciprocity or
whether they merely provide presents to each other based on a distributional
concern for fairness
A rst way to study the role of distributional concerns as a possible expla
nation for Berg et als ndings is by comparing the investment game with a
dierent game in which repayment by R is impossible If payments by C would
remain high in this dierent game then one may view Cs behavior mainly as
a reection of distributional concerns One problem with such an experiment is
that the two dierent games rely on dierent verbal instructions repayments
are not mentioned at all in the treatment where they are impossible Con
sequently the results of the two games are not really comparable since the
individuals may have been induced by the instructions to think in a certain
way
In the experiment of this paper we avoid dierences in verbal instructions by
introducing in the standard investment game an upper bound r for repayments
from R to C The upper bound r is our treatment variable It can be varied
systematically to study the potential distributional concerns in the investment
game while at the same time keeping the verbal framing the same If the
upper bound r is close to the maximum possible repayment the original setup
of Berg et al is approximated In contrast if r is close to zero the treatment of
no possible repayment is approached From the extent to which contributions
and repayments dier across the alternative treatments we can learn the role of
trust and reciprocity versus distributional concerns in the investment setting
In section  we describe our experimental procedures and formulate some
hypotheses Section  presents and discusses the results Concluding remarks
follow in section 
pure distributional concerns 

 Experimental procedure and hypotheses
The investment game is played as follows Each contributor C has an initial
endowment of   chips and must decide how much to send to the reciprocator
R Denote the actual amount contributed by c which can be any integer
satisfying    c     The amount contributed is then doubled to c and
received by R who must then decide whether and how much to repay to C
The repayment is denoted by rc and can be any integer amount such that
   rc   min fr  cg The instruction and decision sheets for r   are
provided in the Appendix
The experiment was performed in  		 at Tilburg University There are
three treatments in each of which   pairs of inidviduals participated Hence
a total of 	 undergraduate participants were recruited Our treatment variable
is r which can take three possible values
r   nearly no repayment
r    full repayment
r    nearly full sharing
Of course our terminology refers to the maximal repayment that is feasible
and not to what is actually done The value per chip is  guilders for both
players C and R The payos in chips are    c  r for C and c  r for
R Note that implicit enforcement mechanisms are ruled out by guaranteeing
anonimity and not repeating the experiment The possibility of learning is not
considered
It is possible to formulate several alternative hypotheses about the indi
viduals behavior The treatment variable r will be particularly important in
this respect A rst hypothesis is that individuals behave according to the tra
ditional concept of subgame perfect equilibrium If this is the case then C
contributes c   and R repays rc   if c  
The next hypothesis is that individuals behave according to the predictions
of the trust and reciprocity model The basic model is discussed in detail
in Berg et al Some of the predictions need to be modied in our context
since there is an upper bound r to what R can repay In particular trust and
At the time of our experiment  dollar   	 guilder 

reciprocity now predicts that C contributes a positive amount but not exceeding
the upper bound r that R can repay so    c   r Correspondingly one may
expect low contributions c if r is small and larger contributions as r increases
Furthermore R may be expected to repay an amount rc  c if there is
full reciprocity or at least a positive amount if there is partial reciprocity A
positive correlation between c and rc may also be expected
The nal hypothesis is that individuals behave according to distributional
considerations This model is distinct from the trust and reciprocity model in
several respects It predicts that C contributes a positive amount    c  
  Hence it is possible that c  r in contrast to the trust and reciprocity
hypothesis Furthermore contributions should no longer necessarily increase as
r increases if C behaves altruistically Finally R sends back an amount rc
to guarantee a more or less fair distribution of the nal outcome rather than
to provide a reasonable rate of return on Cs initial investment contribution
Preferences for equal payo s are perhaps the most natural example of con
cerns for distribution or fairness To achieve equal payos one way or another
it is necessary that C contributes a minimum amount of c   R can then
repay a positive amount r     c to yield equal payos for both An
interesting special case of preferences for equal payos obtains when individuals
obtain a Paretoecient outcome under the equal payo constraint It can eas
ily be veried that this amounts to maximizing the joint prots   c subject
to the constraint that payos are equal ie    c  rc  c  rc or
rc  c    and the feasibility constraints    c     and    rc  
min fr  cg The solution to this program is c     r and rc  r if
r    and c  r    if r   
 Results
Table   provides all the data of our experiment For each of the three treat
ments   pairs of individuals have been matched The actual contributions c
and the corresponding repayment rc are listed in increasing order At the
bottom of each column the average contribution c the average repayment r
and the average repayment ratio rc are given
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The predictions of the subgame perfection equilibrium are clearly rejected
As in Berg et al both C and R usually send positive amounts Are the results
consistent with the predictions of the trust and reciprocity hypothesis The
evidence on the contributors side seems indeed roughly consistent with it In
particular the average contribution c is signicantly larger if r    or r   
than if r   Hence contributors generally seem to care about what they can
receive back Note that the average contribution under r    does not dier
signicantly from the one under r    This suggests that the contributors do
not perceive the upper bound on repayment r    as a binding constraint to
R ie R is not expected to pay back more than   anyway The only pieces of
These claims are based on the MannWhitney U test which is a nonparametric test to

evidence on the contributors side against the trust and reciprocity hypothesis
is found in the treatment r   
 out of   contributors sent more than
they could possibly be repaid for these individuals other considerations than
investment based on trust are present Yet notice that even these generous
oers generally do not exceed any of the contributions in the second and third
treatment where higher repayments are feasible The only exception is one
oer of 
 in the rst treatment but even this oer is below the average in the
other two treatments
What support for the trust and reciprocity hypothesis can be found on the
reciprocators side In all three treatments the average amount repaid by R
is less than what was actually received though the dierence is not signicant
in the rst and the third treatment Paying interest is thus rather rare for
r   it occurs  times in  feasible cases for r    never in    cases and
for r    only twice in   cases Despite the relatively low repayments there
is a signicantly positive correlation between the contribution c and the repay
ment rc of 
 in the second treatment and of 

 in the third treatment
at signicance levels of   and  respectively This suggests that
there may be at least partial reciprocity in these treatments In the rst treat
ment we estimate a negative but insignicant correlation between contribution
and repayment of  
 signicance level of  This follows from a
presumably binding upper bound on what R can repay in this treatment
Finally to which extent can the results be reconciled with the hypothesis
compare the medians of pairs of outcomes  We found zstatistics for signicant dierences in
contributions of     and  	 when comparing r   with r   r   with r  	
and r   with r  	 respectively  This corresponds to signicance levels of    
and   
The zstatistics for the ManWhitney U test for signicant dierences between contribu
tion and repayment are     and   in treatment r   r   and r  	 respectively 
This corresponds to signicance levels of     and  	 
Berg et al  obtained more frequent cases of paying interest  This is because their exper
imental design was made more favourable to high repayments in two respects  First they
assume a tripling instead of a doubling of the contribution  We preferred to make the pro
ductivity of investment not too high since a low contribution may then just be perceived as
wasteful behavior  Furthermore they endow the reciprocator R with an initial showup fee 
We use the Spearman rank correlation coecient to test for the existence of correlation
between c and r
c using the observations of each treatment separately 

that distributional considerations are present Recall that there are 
 out of  
contributions in treatment r   that violate the trust and reciprocity model
and that are not inconsistent with distributional considerations But as noted
above even these 
 cases are not that generous when they are compared to
the contributions of the second and third treatments To learn more about the
possibility of distributional considerations let us focus on outcomes in which C
and R obtain equal payos As explained in the previous section equal payos
are made feasible only if C contributes a minimum amount of  This occurs
in only one case in the rst treatment in  
 cases in the second treatment and
in   cases in the third treatment So in  out of  cases the contributor
clearly has no preferences for an equal payo outcome
Are equal payos in fact frequently achieved relative to the total number of
cases in which it has been made feasible by C To allow for mistakes or other
aspects of behavior let us consider almost equal payo s dened as payos
that dier by at most one chip For a given contribution c sometimes two
repayments r can yield almost equal payos eg for c   both repayments
r  
 and r   would induce almost equal payos Note that almost equal
payos are feasible whenever C has contributed a minimum amount of  It
can be veried that almost equal payos occur in only   out of 
 feasible cases
in the rst treatment in  out of   feasible cases in the second treatment and
in  out of   cases in the third treatment Hence there is little support for a
preference of almost equal payos by the reciprocators
Using the formula of the previous section Paretoecient equal payos re
quire that C contributes c  
 rounded for r   and c    for r   
and r    Only one contributor in the rst treatment behaved this way
compared to respectively four and three contributors in the second and third
treatment Half of the reciprocators responded by repaying the almost equal
payo amount the others repaid less
 Final Remarks
We have designed an experiment to study whether commodity transfers can be
viewed as investments based on trust and reciprocity or whether they rather
resemble presents with distributional concerns By varying the upper bound

to what a contributor can be repaid afterwards extreme situations such as
unrestricted repayment and no repayment can be approximated without alter
ing the verbal instructions otherwise Our results demonstrate that individuals
contribute more when large repayments are feasible than when nearly no repay
ment is feasible This is consistent with the trust and reciprocity hypothesis
Although distributional concerns in some contributions can be traced they are
not nearly close to a preference for equal payos
 Appendix
INSTRUCTIONS For person A
In the experiment we will match you with another student at random You
are student A and the other student is student B You person A will receive
  points which person B does not receive We ask you to decide if you want
to give some of the   points to the person you are matched with and if so to
write the amount at the bottom of this page We will collect your form double
the amount you wrote and give the form to the person you are matched with
Then person B with whom you are matched will decide if heshe wants to
give something back to you this amount will not be doubled Person B can
give you back at most  points and of course no more than twice the amount
you gave
We will then collect all forms and pay each of you accordingly
INSTRUCTIONS For person B
In the experiment we will match you with another student at random You
are student B and the other student is student A Person A will receive  
points which you will not receive We asked person A if heshe wants to give
some of the   points to you and if so to write down the amount at the bottom
of the page We will collect the form double the amount person A wrote and
give it to you
Then you will decide ify ou want to give something back to the person A
with whom you are matched this amount will not be doubled You can give
back at most  points and of course no more then twice the amount person A
gave to you
	
We will then collect all the forms and pay each of you accordingly
For student A
Your registration number 
The number of points you give to person B with whom you are matched

For person B
Your registration number 
The number of points you give to person A with whom you are matched
no more than twice the number of points person A gave and no more than 

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